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ABSTRACT
Decision-tree-based ensemble classification methods (DTEMs) are a prevalent tool for supervised anomaly
detection. However, due to the continued growth of datasets, DTEMs result in increasing drawbacks such as
growing memory footprints, longer training times, and slower classification latencies at lower throughput. In this
paper, we present, design, and evaluate RADE - a DTEM-based anomaly detection framework that augments
standard DTEM classifiers and alleviates these drawbacks by relying on two observations: (1) we find that a small
(coarse-grained) DTEM model is sufficient to classify the majority of the classification queries correctly, such
that a classification is valid only if its corresponding confidence level is greater than or equal to a predetermined
classification confidence threshold; (2) we find that in these fewer harder cases where our coarse-grained DTEM
model results in insufficient confidence in its classification, we can improve it by forwarding the classification
query to one of expert DTEM (fine-grained) models, which is explicitly trained for that particular case. We
implement RADE in Python based on scikit-learn and evaluate it over different DTEM methods: RF, XGBoost,
AdaBoost, GBDT and LightGBM, and over three publicly available datasets. Our evaluation over both a strong
AWS EC2 instance and a Raspberry Pi 3 device indicates that RADE offers competitive and often superior
anomaly detection capabilities as compared to standard DTEM methods, while significantly improving memory
footprint (by up to 5.46×), training-time (by up to 17.2×), and classification latency (by up to 31.2×).
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and related work
Supervised anomaly detection includes a wide range of
applications such as finance, fraud detection, surveillance,
health care, intrusion detection, fault detection in safety-
critical systems, and medical diagnosis. For example,
anomalies in network traffic could mean that a hacked device
is sending out sensitive data to an unauthorized destination;
anomalies in a credit card transaction could indicate credit
card or identity theft; and, anomaly readings from various
sensors could signify a faulty behavior in hardware or a soft-
ware component. A popular supervised machine learning
(ML) solution for anomaly detection is to employ decision-
tree-based ensemble classification methods (DTEMs) which
rely on either bagging or boosting techniques to improve
the detection capabilities, as explained in the following.
Bagging (or bootstrap aggregation) (Breiman, 1996) is
used to reduce the classification variance and by that im-
prove its accuracy. Random Forest (RF) (Breiman, 2001) is
the most well-known decision-tree-based bagging method,
which grows each decision tree according to a random sub-
1VMware Research 2Technion. Correspondence to: Shay
Vargaftik <shayv@vmware.com>, Yaniv Ben-Itzhak <yben-
itzhak@vmware.com>.
sample of the features and the data instances, resulting in
different trees. Then, a majority vote is used to determine
the classification.
Several studies (Zhang & Zulkernine, 2005; Singh et al.,
2014; Tavallaee et al., 2009; Hasan et al., 2014) have pro-
posed using RF for supervised anomaly detection. For
instance, (Zhang & Zulkernine, 2005) employed RF for
anomaly detection by using data mining techniques to se-
lect features and handle the class imbalance problem; and,
(Singh et al., 2014) provided a scalable implementation of
quasi-real-time intrusion detection system.
RF is a popular classifier as it offers many appealing ad-
vantages over other classification methods, such as Neural
Networks (Ashfaq et al., 2017), Support Vector Machines
(Gan et al., 2013), Fuzzy Logic methods (Bridges et al.,
2000), and Bayesian Networks (Kruegel & Vigna, 2003).
Specifically, RF offers: (1) robustness and moderate sen-
sitivity to hyper-parameters; (2) low training complexity;
(3) natural resilience to deal with imbalanced datasets and
tiny classes with very little information; (4) embedded fea-
ture selection and ranking capabilities; (5) handling missing,
categorical and continuous features; (6) interpretability for
advanced human analysis for further investigation or when-
ever such capability is required by regulations (Right to
explanation, 2019), e.g., in order to understand the underly-
ing risks. To that end, an RF can be interpreted by different
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methods, such as (Banerjee et al., 2012).
All these aforementioned advantages are repeatedly pointed
out in the literature via analysis as well as comparative tests
(see (Resende & Drummond, 2018; Moustafa et al., 2018;
Habeeb et al., 2018) and references therein) especially for
intrusion detection (IDS) purposes (Zhang & Zulkernine,
2005; Tavallaee et al., 2009; Hasan et al., 2014), fraud de-
tection (Xuan et al., 2018) and online anomaly detection
capabilities (Zhao et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2014).
Boosting. Unlike bagging, boosting primarily reduces clas-
sification bias (and also variance). Many popular decision-
tree-based boosting methods such as GBDT (Friedman,
2001; Hastie et al., 2009), XGBoost (Chen & Guestrin,
2016), LightGBM (Ke et al., 2017) and AdaBoost (Freund
et al., 1996) employ the boosting concept, usually, by using
iterative training. For example, in Adaptive Boosting, a
weak classifier such as a stump is added at each iteration
(unlike bagging methods that use fully grown trees) and typ-
ically weighted with respect to its accuracy. Then, the data
weights are readjusted such that a higher weight is given to
the misclassified instances. In Gradient Boosting, a small
decision tree (e.g., with 8-32 terminal nodes) is added at
each iteration and scaled by a constant factor. Then, a new
tree is grown to reduce the loss function of the previous
trees. For both methods, the next trees are trained with more
focus on previous misclassifications.
Decision-tree-based boosting methods are known to be
among the best off-the-shelf supervised learning methods
available (Roe et al., 2006; Schapire, 2003; Liu et al., 2017;
Roe et al., 2005), achieving excellent accuracy with only
modest memory footprint, as opposed to RF that is usually
memory bounded. Boosting methods also share many of the
aforementioned advantages offered by RF such as natural
resilience to deal with imbalanced datasets and tiny classes,
embedded feature selection, and ranking capabilities, and
handling missing, categorical and continuous features (Jin
& Chuang, 2017).
Decision-tree-based boosting methods are also known to be
especially appealing for anomaly detection purposes where
data is often highly imbalanced (e.g., credit card transactions
or cyber-security) (Pfahringer, 2000; Li, 2012). This is
mainly because decision-tree-based boosting methods alter
their focus between the different iterations on the more
difficult training instances. This often produces a stronger
strategy to deal with imbalanced datasets by strengthening
the impact of the anomalies and, when adequately trained,
boosting methods may usually achieve higher accuracy (as
well as precision and recall) than a traditional RF classifier.
That being said, boosting methods are also more sensitive
to overfitting than RF, especially when the data is noisy
(Dietterich, 2000). The training of boosting-based meth-
ods generally takes much longer than RF, mainly since the
trees are built sequentially and compute-intensive tasks such
as classification and data weights readjustments take place
at every iteration. Moreover, boosting-based methods are
harder to tune as compared to RF, as they have more param-
eters and higher sensitivity to these parameters.
Finally, both bagging (RF) and boosting methods are preva-
lent tools for supervised anomaly detection with shared and
distinct pros and cons, and there is no clear winner in this
classification contest as the best classifier often depends on
the specific dataset and the application.
1.2 Challenges
In recent years, supervised anomaly detection via DTEMs
is becoming extremely difficult. This is because traditional
bagging DTEMs (i.e., random forest) classifiers can be
highly effective, but tend to be memory bound, and slower
at classification (Liaw et al., 2002; Van Essen et al., 2012;
Mishina et al., 2015). Furthermore, the classification latency
of an RF increases with the RF depth (Asadi et al., 2014).
Accordingly, previous work suggested different approaches
to tackle the memory and performance drawbacks of RF.
The study of (Van Essen et al., 2012) achieves deterministic
latency by producing compact random forests composed
of many, small trees rather than fewer, deep trees. Other
studies (Asadi et al., 2014; Browne et al., 2018) optimize
memory-layouts of RF, which reduces cache misses.
On the other hand, boosting DTEMs are slow to train and
tune and also admit slower classification as the number
of trees increases (Appel et al., 2013; Ravanshad, 2018).
Much effort has been made to address these drawbacks.
For example, recent scalable implementations of the tree-
based gradient boosting methods include: XGBoost (Chen
& Guestrin, 2016) that supports parallelism and uses pre-
sorted and histogram-based algorithms for computing the
best split; LightGBM (Ke et al., 2017) that uses a novel
technique of Gradient-based One-Side Sampling (GOSS)
to filter out the data instances for finding a split value; Cat-
Boost (Prokhorenkova et al., 2018) that implements ordered
boosting, a permutation-driven alternative to the classic algo-
rithm and an innovative algorithm for processing categorical
features (e.g., giving indices of categorical columns such
that it can be encoded by one-hot encoding). For Adaptive
boosting (i.e., AdaBoost), several approaches have been
suggested as well to accelerate its slow training (Chu &
Zaniolo, 2004; Seyedhosseini et al., 2011; Olson, 2017).
For example (Seyedhosseini et al., 2011) introduces a new
sampling strategy (WNS) that selects a representative subset
of the data at each iteration and by that reducing the number
of data points onto which AdaBoost is applied.
Nevertheless, both bagging and boosting DTEM methods
are challenged by the continuous growth of datasets (Li et al.,
2014) in terms of the number of features, data instances,
and the increasing demand for lower memory footprints,
faster training, and lower classification latency. That is,
while a sufficiently large DTEM classifier may offer a sat-
isfactory anomaly detection capabilities when adequately
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Table 1: Baseline DTEM models. Number of trees and tree
depth limitations for each DTEM classifier and dataset (RF
is trained without tree depth limitation).
KDD CCF FC
RF C(150, None) C(85, None) C(80, None)
GBDT C(1400, 5) C(600, 5) C(800, 5)
XGBoost C(450, 3) C(500, 3) C(2000, 3)
LightGBM C(1000, 5) C(1600, 5) C(2800, 3)
AdaBoost C(700, 3) C(1100, 2) C(1000, 3)
trained, it would typically suffer from at least one of the
following drawbacks: (1) large memory footprint; (2) long
training (which also incurs high energy consumption); (3)
high classification latency and low classification throughput.
Overcoming these drawbacks is essential for efficient
DTEM-based anomaly detection systems that are required
to have the ability to quickly train a proper classifier in a
timely manner and to offer low classification latency and
high throughput at reasonable memory footprints and costs.
1.3 Contributions
In this paper, we present RADE, which addresses the afore-
mentioned drawbacks of DTEM methods. RADE is or-
thogonal to the discussed bagging and boosting techniques
and can augment them to form more efficient DTEM classi-
fiers. We implement and evaluate RADE for RF, XGBoost,
AdaBoost, GBDT, and LightGBM.
The design of RADE mainly relies on the two following
observations, which are further detailed in Section 2:
(1) We find that a small (coarse-grained) DTEM model
is sufficient to classify the majority of the classification
queries correctly. To that end, we define a confidence level
threshold, such that a classification is considered to be valid
only when its classification confidence level is higher than
or equal to this given threshold.
(2) We find that in these fewer harder cases where our coarse-
grained DTEM model exhibits insufficient confidence in its
classification, we can improve it by forwarding the classifi-
cation query to one of expert DTEM (fine-grained) models,
which is explicitly trained for that particular case.
Finally, in Section 5, we present evaluation results over
three publicly available datasets and on a strong AWS EC2
instance as well as on a Raspberry Pi 3 device. The results
are consistent and indicate that RADE always offers com-
petitive and often superior anomaly detection capabilities
as compared to the standard DTEM methods. For Bagging
(RF), RADE significantly improves the training-time (by
up to 6.42×), classification latency (by up to 7.23×), and
memory consumption (by up to 5.46×); For Boosting (e.g.,
XGBoost and AdaBoost), RADE significantly improves the
classification latency (by up to 31.2×) and training time (by
up to 17.2×), while being competitive in model memory
footprint (always in the range of [0.64×, 2.92×]).
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Figure 1: Baseline tuning examples by sweeping over the
number of trees. (a) The best F1 score for the RF classifier
over the KDD dataset is achieved for 150 trees with no depth
limitation, i.e., C(150, None). (b) The best F1 score for
XGBoost classifier over the FC dataset is achieved for 2000
trees with depth limitation of 3, i.e., C(2000, 3).
2 RADE PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Baseline DTEM models
We evaluate RADE and quantify its benefits by compar-
ing it to standard DTEM models we term baseline models.
Specifically, we define a baseline model for three different
datasets (KDD (Machine Learning Repository - UCI, 1999),
Credit-Card Fraud (CCF) (Machine Learning Group - ULB,
2013), and Forest Cover (FC) (Machine Learning Reposi-
tory - UCI, 1998)) and for five different DTEM classifiers
(RF (Breiman, 2001), GBDT (Friedman, 2001; Hastie et al.,
2009), XGBoost (Chen & Guestrin, 2016), LightGBM (Ke
et al., 2017) and AdaBoost (Freund et al., 1996)). For each
dataset and DTEM classifier, we choose the baseline model
for comparison by sweeping over different parameters and
conducting 5-fold cross-validation for each measurement.
Figure 1 shows two such examples. In these specific exam-
ples, we depict the F1 score as a function of the number of
trees for the RF model over the KDD dataset (1(a)) and for
the XGBoost model over the FC dataset (1(b)). Note that
we conduct sweeps over the number of trees for different
parameters (e.g., class/sample weights for RF, the number
of features to consider for a split, tree depth limitations,
learning rate for XGBoost) and in these examples, the other
parameters are already chosen accordingly.
Remark. Interestingly, these two sweeps already point out
the weaknesses of bagging and boosting methods: (1) The
sweep in Figure 1(a) lasted for 699 seconds and required
205 MB, whereas a similar sweep for XGBoost (over KDD)
lasted as much as 14865 seconds but required only 8 MB; (2)
Similarly, the sweep in Figure 1(b) lasted for 25442 seconds
and required 47 MB, whereas a similar sweep for RF (over
FC) lasted only 425 seconds but required 340 MB1.
ML performance metric. In this paper, we use per-class
F1 score to quantify the anomaly detection capabilities of
1These specific baseline tuning examples were conducted on
an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU @ 3.60GHz with 4 Cores and
8 Logical Processors.
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Figure 2: The useful classification fraction and its resulting F1 score by a small (coarse-grained) model, when a classification
is valid only if its confidence level is greater than or equal to a given classification confidence threshold (CCT). Our
observation is that most classifications can be achieved by a coarse-grained model, with a similar/higher resulting F1 score
as compared to the F1 score achieved by a much bigger model – termed baseline model4. The vertical lines indicate the
lowest CCT for each dataset and model such that the resulting F1 score exceeds the F1 score by a baseline model (see Table
1 for details). Note that any other CCT value can be set according to the desired tradeoff between the useful classification
fraction and its resulting F1 score. Demonstrated for KDD (Machine Learning Repository - UCI, 1999), Credit Card Fraud
(CCF) (Machine Learning Group - ULB, 2013), and Forest Cover (FC) (Machine Learning Repository - UCI, 1998) datasets,
over five different DTEM classifiers, RF (Breiman, 2001), GBDT (Friedman, 2001; Hastie et al., 2009), XGBoost (Chen &
Guestrin, 2016), LightGBM (Ke et al., 2017) and AdaBoost (Freund et al., 1996). In all evaluations, we use a 5-fold cross
validation and depict the mean value and variance.
ML models since this score takes into account the imbal-
anced nature of the datasets in anomaly detection use-cases.
Nevertheless, we also consider the Area Under the Curve
(AUC) and Average Precision (which is more suitable for
skewed datasets) metrics, and obtain similar results.
Classifier configuration. For ease of exposition, we denote
a classifier with T trees, each limited to a depth of D, by
C(T,D). A classifier without a depth limitation is denoted
by C(T,None). Table 1 summaries the baseline DTEM
classifiers which we use throughout the paper.
2.2 Observations
In this work, we target binary supervised anomaly-detection
classification with Normal and Anomaly imbalanced classes,
and discuss multi-class anomaly detection as a future direc-
tion/extension of RADE in Section 6. In the following, we
describe the two main aforementioned observations which
our solution is based on.
Observation 1: A small DTEM model can classify most
of the classification queries with a high F1 score.
Figure 2 exemplifies via three datasets (KDD, CCF and FC.
Further details are in Section 5.1), and over five DTEMs (RF,
GBDT, XGBoost, LightGBM, and AdaBoost) that a small
DTEM model, which we term coarse-grained model, can
be used to correctly classify the majority of classification
queries (but not necessarily all) by requiring a sufficiently
high classification confidence level2. That is, the classifi-
cation result of the coarse-grained model is valid only if
its corresponding confidence level is greater than or equal
to a predetermined classification confidence threshold (de-
noted by CCT), rather than simply accepting any classifica-
tion confidence3. We empirically find that this approach of
setting a higher CCT value to make a valid classification,
2For a DTEM classifier, the classification and its confidence
level is determined by the classification distribution vector. For
example, if the classification output of an instance is (Normal=0.78,
Anomaly=0.22) that means the instance is classified as Normal
with a classification confidence level of 0.78.
3For example, if the prediction output of a sample is (Nor-
mal=0.83, Anomaly=0.17) and CCT= 0.9 that means the classifi-
cation is not valid and this query requires further attention as we
later detail in Section 3.
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results in a high fraction of the data instances being valid
classifications with a high F1 score for both Normal and
Anomaly classes.
Specifically, as can be seen in Figure 2, the fraction of the
valid classifications (out of the total data instances) reduces
as CCT increases, and their respective F1 score increases4
since only the classifications with a higher confidence level
(i.e., valid) are being considered5. Furthermore, the fraction
of the Normal data instances is significantly higher than
the Anomaly fraction as CCT increases. Intuitively, this is
because the Anomaly labeled instances are harder to classify,
as there are significantly fewer Anomaly instances than the
Normal instances available for training.
We have found this observation to be consistent for all tested
datasets. These include the three datasets discussed in this
paper, as well as a Bankruptcy data set (Machine Learning
Repository - UCI, 2013; Zie˛ba et al., 2016), a Shuttle data
set (Machine Learning Repository - UCI, 1988) and differ-
ent synthetic datasets generated by the scikit-learn machine
learning Python package (Pedregosa et al., 2011).
As we later discuss and demonstrate, any CCT value can
be set according to the desired tradeoff between the useful
classification fraction and its resulting F1 score. The ver-
tical black lines in Figure 2 indicate the lowest CCT for
each dataset and classifier such that the resulting F1 score
of the valid classifications of both the Normal and Anomaly
classes exceed the total F1 score of its corresponding base-
line model, as detailed in Table 1 (for the baseline models,
a valid classification is any classification with a confidence
level of a least 0.5, i.e., all classification queries are valid
and considered). Finally, we provide two examples to clarify
the findings depicted by Figure 2.
Example 1. By setting CCT=0.995 (instead of the usual 0.5)
when using the RF model, C(20, 10), for the CCF dataset,
we obtain that a fraction that accounts for 51.6% of the Nor-
mal data instances is classified with F1 score of ≈ 0.99991;
and a fraction that accounts for 45.5% of the Anomaly data
instances is classified with F1 score of ≈ 0.943. Whereas,
the corresponding baseline DTEM model, C(85, None),
achieves F1 score of ≈ 0.99974 and ≈ 0.8344, respectively.
Example 2. By setting CCT=0.99 (instead of the usual 0.5)
when using the XGBoost model, C(70, 5), for the KDD
dataset, we obtain that a fraction that accounts for 99.8%
of the Normal data instances is classified with F1 score
of ≈ 0.99993; and a fraction that accounts for 94.2% of
4Unless the CCT is set too high, such that the fraction of valid
classifications, especially anomalies, drops to nearly zero and the
remaining few instances may admit a high classification variance
(See XGBoost over CCF in Figure 2 for example). Such CCT
values are not reasonable operating points for RADE.
5Our usage of a classification confidence level is inherently
different from the threshold used to produce a ROC curve. That is,
when producing a ROC curve, the threshold only determines the
result of a classification query and not whether it is valid.
the Anomaly data instances is classified with F1 score of
≈ 0.9992. Whereas, the corresponding baseline DTEM
model, C(450, 3), achieves F1 score of ≈ 0.99993 and
≈ 0.9962, respectively.
Observation 2: Train expert (fine-grained) classifiers to
succeed specifically where the coarse-grained model is
not sufficiently confident.
When applying the approach suggested by the previous
Observation 1, we remain with a small fraction of the data
instances without a valid classification by the coarse-grained
model due to an insufficient classification confidence level
(i.e., queries for which the top-1 class probability is lower
than CCT). These queries are the harder data instances and,
most importantly, as depicted in Figure 2, contain most of
the anomalies as the CCT increases.
Our second main observation is that we can leverage the
classification distribution vector of the coarse-grained model
over the training data to: (1) filter most of the training data
by using a training confidence threshold (TCT), and to (2)
train expert classifiers, which we term fine-grained models,
that are trained to succeed specifically where the coarse-
grained model is not sufficiently confident and is more likely
to make a classification mistake. The training dataset of
each fine-grained classifier is defined according to TCT
and the resulting classification distribution vectors of the
coarse-grained model (see Section 3 for more details).
As we show in Section 5.2, these training datasets of the fine-
grained classifiers are tailored such that they focus on the
harder data instances and improve the Normal to Anomaly
ratio of the labeled instances as compared to the training
dataset of the coarse-grained and baseline classifiers. As a
result, we find that the fine-grained models achieve better
F1 score for the low-confidence data instances.
Furthermore, these tailored training datasets are much
smaller as compared to the training sets of the coarse-
grained and baseline classifiers, which in turn significantly
reduces the required training time (and hence the corre-
sponding energy consumption). This attribute is especially
appealing for the boosting methods (see Section 5).
2.3 The intuition behind RADE
So far, we have mainly discussed the ML-performance of
RADE and why, intuitively, it is expected to result in a high
F1 score. Now we discuss further intuition to why RADE
also results in lower memory footprint, lower training time
(and hence lower energy consumption) and lower classifica-
tion latency, as compared to the baseline models.
The training time complexity of DTEM methods depends
on the size of the training dataset (i.e., the number of train-
ing instances), the number of features, the number of trees
and their depth limitations (if there are any). Whereas, the
classification latency mostly depends on the model size (i.e.,
the number of trees, and their depths).
Clearly, the smaller model size of a coarse-grained classi-
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Figure 3: RADE architecture - a small (coarse-grained)
model and two expert (fine-grained) models. The training
confidence threshold (TCT) at the coarse-grained model
determines the training data for each fine-grained classifier.
For classification, the classification confidence threshold
(CCT) at the coarse-grained model determines whether a
classification query takes the short or the long path and
which fine-grained model is queried for the latter case.
fier directly improves all of the criteria mentioned above.
Additionally, as mentioned, the fine-grained classifiers are
being trained by smaller datasets, which reduces their train-
ing time, and, often, their size. Indeed, our evaluation in
Section 5 shows that the size of the fine-grained models is
smaller as compared to their corresponding baseline model
for all tested data sets and classification methods.
Essentially, when considering a RADE model (i.e., both the
coarse-grained and fine-grained models), the classification
latency of RADE equals to a weighted average of the la-
tencies according to the fraction of the classifications that
are served by the coarse-grained and fine-grained models.
Since the coarse-grained model serves most of the classi-
fications, the averaged classification latency is expected to
significantly improved as compared to the baseline model.
Furthermore, our evaluation shows that the worst-case clas-
sification latency of RADE (i.e., the latency of a query that
takes the longest path of coarse-grained model and then the
slowest fine-grained model) is also competitive and often
lower than the latency of its corresponding baseline model
(for more details, see the evaluation in Section 5).
On the other hand, the training time and model size of
RADE equal to the corresponding sums of the coarse-
grained and fine-grained models. Nevertheless, as presented
in Section 5, our evaluation indicates that RADE reduces
the memory footprint and training time, as compared to the
baseline models.
To summarize, both the coarse-grained and fine-grained
models contribute to the overall improvements of RADE, in
the following ways: The coarse-grained model is (1) based
on a small classifier and, (2) serves most of the classifica-
tion queries. The fine-grained models are (1) being trained
by smaller data sets, (2) smaller as compared to the corre-
sponding baseline and, (3) serve only a small fraction of the
classification queries.
3 RADE
Training. Algorithm 1 describes the procedure for training
a RADE model. It begins with the training of a coarse-
grained model (denoted by Mcg) using the entire labeled
dataset. Next, we train the fine-grained models (denoted
by M ifg for fine-grained model i). To that end, we classify
the labeled dataset by the coarse-grained model (line 5).
Then, if the confidence level of the predicted top-1 class
(i.e., max(dx)) is lower than the given training threshold
(TCT), the labeled data instance is forwarded to both experts
if its label is Anomaly (lines 7-9) or otherwise to a single
fine-grained model according to the prediction made by
Mcg (lines 11-15). Notice that in lines 11-15, the data
instances are forwarded according to their low-confidence
coarse-grained classification, and not according to their
labels. The reason is that we train the fine-grained models
to succeed specifically where the coarse-grained model is
insufficiently confident and is more likely to make a mistake.
More specifically, as illustrated in Figure 3(b), the data in-
stances that are forwarded to fine-grained model 1 contain:
(1) all low confidence Anomaly instances and, (2) low con-
fidence Normal instances that are correctly classified by
the coarse-grained model. Intuitively, this model becomes
an expert in distinguishing between Normal instances that
are correctly classified by the coarse-grained model and
Anomaly instances. Likewise, the data instances that are
forwarded to fine-grained model 2 contain: (1) all low con-
fidence Anomaly instances and, (2) low confidence Nor-
mal instances that are misclassified by the coarse-grained
model. Intuitively, this model becomes an expert in dis-
tinguishing between misclassified Normal instances by the
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coarse-grained model and Anomaly instances.
The Anomaly class is significantly smaller (usually by
orders of magnitude) than the Normal class in terms of
the number of instances, and its low-confidence subset is
even smaller. This fact results in two potential drawbacks,
which we mitigate by the duplication of the low-confidence
Anomaly labeled instances to both fine-grained models
(lines 8-9), as explained in the following:
Less accurate Anomaly coarse-grained classification: Since
the coarse-grained model is trained using a rather small
number of Anomaly instances as compared to the number of
Normal instances, its classifications over these instances are
very noisy with many misclassifications as compared to the
Normal instances (see Figure 2). Namely, the classification
distribution vector over these instances has a significant
variance, which is even more severe for the low-confidence
Anomaly subset. This makes the classification of the coarse-
grained model as to which fine-grained model we need
to send a specific low-confidence Anomaly instance less
reliable (unlike for the Normal instances).
Increased overfitting likelihood by the fine-grained mod-
els: Due to the small cardinality of the low-confidence
subset of the Anomaly instances, it is more likely for a fine-
grained classifier to receive a non-sufficient number of such
instances for training. This, in turn, increases the likelihood
of overfitting the model. That is, it is more likely for the
training of a fine-grained classifier to terminate in a state in
which it has a nearly perfect F1 score for the low-confidence
subset of the Anomaly instances that were forwarded by the
coarse-grained model for its training, but this fine-grained
model is likely to be less accurate at classification of a low-
confidence Anomaly instance that may have been sent to
the wrong fine-grained model and thus is more likely to be
too different from other labeled instances this fine-grained
classifier was trained on.
Therefore, by forwarding all the low-confidence subset of
Anomalies to both experts, as we empirically find in our eval-
uations, reduces the likelihood of both drawbacks and makes
the fine-grained models better experts for those queries in
which the coarse-grained model is more likely to make a
classification mistake (i.e., Observation 2).
Note that this duplication (i.e., lines 8-9) results in a very
low overhead in terms of the number of data instances used
for the fine-grained models training (see Table 2).
Classification. Algorithm 2 describes the procedure for a
classification by RADE, and Figure 3(c) illustrates it. First,
we classify an arriving data instance by the coarse-grained
model (lines 1-2). Whenever the resulting confidence level
of the top-1 classification is greater than or equal to the
classification confidence threshold, CCT, the classification
by the coarse-grained model is valid and therefore returned
(line 4). As shown in Figure 2, we empirically find that most
of the data instances result in a high confidence level. There-
fore, since the size of the coarse-grained model is small,
Algorithm 1 RADE training
Input: Labeled training data set X , confidence level TCT.
1: train Mcg using X
2: set: data[fg1] = ∅
3: set: data[fg2] = ∅
4: for each x ∈ X:
5: obtain coarse-grained distribution: dx = Mcg(x)
6: if max(dx) < TCT:
7: if x.label == Anomaly:
8: update: data[fg1].append(x)
9: update: data[fg2].append(x)
10: else:
11: classify: y = argmax(dx)
12: if y == Normal:
13: update: data[fg1].append(x)
14: else:
15: update: data[fg2].append(x)
16: train M1fg using data[fg1]
17: train M2fg using data[fg2]
Algorithm 2 RADE classification
Input: Unlabeled data point x, confidence level CCT.
1: obtain coarse-grained distribution: dx = Mcg(x)
2: classify: y = argmax(dx)
3: if max(dx) ≥ CCT:
4: return y
5: else:
6: y == Normal ? c = 1 : c = 2
7: obtain fine-grained distribution: d¯x = Mcfg
8: classify: y¯ = argmax(d¯x)
9: return y¯
these classification instances experience an extremely low-
latency and high-throughput classification. The remaining
small fraction of the data instances whose coarse-grained
classification is not valid (i.e., which their resulting con-
fidence level is lower than CCT) is forwarded to one of
the fine-grained models, which is chosen according to the
coarse-grained classification (lines 6-9). Specifically, if the
coarse-grained low-confidence classification is Normal, then
the instance is forwarded to fine-grained model 1 which is
trained to distinguish between Normal instances that are cor-
rectly classified by the coarse-grained model and Anomaly
instances (see Figure 3(b)). Likewise, if the coarse-grained
(low-confidence) classification is Anomaly, then the instance
is forwarded to fine-grained model 2 which is trained to dis-
tinguish between Normal instances that are misclassified by
the coarse-grained model and Anomaly instances.
Putting it all together. Figure 3 depicts a high-level ar-
chitecture of RADE, and the training and classification
data-forwarding schemes. We may use different confidence
level thresholds for the fine-grained models training (TCT)
and the classification/anomaly detection (CCT), such that
TCT≥CCT. The intuition for why it may be of interest to
set TCT>CCT, is that it allows to train the fine-grained
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models with a bigger subset of the labeled data instances
as compared to the classification subset that is forwarded
to them. Tuning TCT, as we empirically find in our evalua-
tions, often improves the anomaly detection capabilities (in
terms of F1 score) for a modest price in training time and
fine-grained model sizes.
Intuitively, the fine-grained models provide better classifi-
cation and hence better anomaly detection for the uncertain
classifications than the coarse-grained model for the follow-
ing reasons: (1) we allow the fine-grained models to have
more resources as compared to the coarse-grained model
(see Section 5.2 for more details); (2) the fine-grained clas-
sifiers are trained by a much smaller fraction of the labeled
training data. Essentially, each fine-grained model becomes
an expert for its corresponding labeled data fraction, which
represents the uncertain (and some of the wrong) classi-
fications by the coarse-grained model. Note that when a
classification query is forwarded to a fine-grained model, it
is solely determined by this fine-grained model.
RADE model. For ease of exposition, we define a
specific configuration of a RADE model by a tuple
R(C(Tcg, Dcg), C(Tfg, Dfg),CCT,TCT), that states the
size limitation of the coarse-grained model followed by the
size limitation of the fine-grained models and finally the
classification and training confidence thresholds.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
RADE implementation is written in Python 3.6 and is based
on the scikit-learn library6 (Pedregosa et al., 2011). RADE
can augment any scikit-based DTEM classifier. Specifically,
we execute RADE for internal scikit classifiers (RandomFor-
est (Scikit - RF, 2019), GradientBoosting (Scikit - GBDT,
2019), and AdaBoost (Scikit - ADABOOST, 2018)), as well
as for Python packages (lightgbm-v2.2.3 (PyPI, LightGBM,
2019), and xgboost-v0.90 (PyPI, XGBoost, 2018)).
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Datasets
As mentioned, we use three different datasets, where all
are widely used, publicly available, and reproducible. To
establish consistency for RADE, we chose the dataset such
that they are all from different areas and use-cases as well
as with different levels of skewness (i.e., the Normal to
Anomaly number of instances ratio).
KDD (Machine Learning Repository - UCI, 1999). This
dataset is a popular benchmark and is widely used for eval-
uation of IDS systems (Dhanabal & Shantharajah, 2015;
Kayacik et al., 2005; Sabhnani & Serpen, 2003). It was
used for The Third International Knowledge Discovery and
Data Mining Tools Competition in which the task was to
build a network intrusion detector. This database contains
a standard set of data to be audited, which includes a wide
6v0.21.3 - released on July 30, 2019 (current stable version).
variety of intrusions simulated in a military network envi-
ronment. In our evaluation, we treat all intrusions (e.g., DoS,
Probe, R2L) as Anomalies (24.389%) and all non-hostile
connections as Normal.
Credit Card Fraud (CCF) (Machine Learning Group
- ULB, 2013). This is a popular dataset that is used for
anomaly and fraud detection benchmarking. (Dal Pozzolo
et al., 2015; Carcillo et al., 2017; Lebichot et al., 2020; Car-
cillo et al., 2019; Dal Pozzolo, 2015). The datasets contains
transactions made by credit cards in September 2013 by eu-
ropean cardholders. This dataset presents transactions that
occurred in two days, with frauds which we treat as Anoma-
lies (0.172%) where all the rest are legitimate transfers and
treated as Normal class.
Forest Cover (FC) (Machine Learning Repository -
UCI, 1998). This dataset is used in predicting forest cover
type from cartographic variables (Blackard, 2000; Gama
et al., 2003; Oza & Russell, 2001; Obradovic & Vucetic,
2004). This study includes four wilderness areas located in
the Roosevelt National Forest of northern Colorado. Class
2 is considered as Normal, and class 4 as Anomaly (0.9%).
5.2 Tuning RADE
The tuning of a RADE classifier starts by identifying a
set of sensible candidate hyperparameters for the coarse-
grained model. Recall that we want a small coarse-grained
model that can make valid classifications for most of the
data instances with a high F1 score (e.g., Figure 2).
To that end, a set of such sensible hyperparameters may
be derived by looking at known default configurations and
thumb rules for a specific standard full-sized classifier and
for similar datasets (if such are known) and considering
smaller sized options such that the resulting coarse-grained
model will be smaller than a standard full-sized classifier by
some constant factor (e.g., 5×).
The candidate hyperparameters for the fine-grained models
are then chosen similarly but by considering larger sizes
(i.e., number of trees, depth limitations) varying from the
coarse-grained and up to a standard model size.
Next, we need to consider candidate CCT and TCT values.
The set of interest is always 0.5 ≤ CCT ≤ TCT ≤ 1
sampled according to some granularity (e.g., 0.05).
Finally, once we have our grid of sensible hyperparame-
ter configurations for RADE, we perform iterations of our
5-fold cross-validation process, each time using different
model settings from this predetermined set. This grid-search
tuning process is no different from standard practice.
Clearly, these parameters are not guaranteed to be optimal.
With that said, finding satisfactory hyperparameters often
requires an extensive grid-search, like any other classifier.
Example. We next demonstrate how CCT and TCT affect
the F1 score, classification latency, training time, and model
size. Figure 4(a) presents these metrics vs. different val-
ues of CCT (with TCT=CCT for simplicity) of a RF-based
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R(C(20, 10), C(25, 10),−,−) for the CCF dataset. We
identify two CCT values, CCT=0.915 and CCT=1, that
achieve the highest Anomaly F1 (marked in the graph).
Notice that, CCT=1 results in forwarding most of the test
dataset to the fine-grained models, which in turn increases
the classification latency. Moreover, as TCT increases, a
higher fraction of the training-data is being forwarded to the
fine-grained models, which in turn increases both the model
size and training-time.
Table 4(b) also presents the Normal to Anomaly ratio
of the training data instances that are forwarded to each
of the fine-grained models. As can be seen, this ratio
is further improved as compared to the original dataset
ratio (581.4) for fine-grained model 1 with CCT=0.915
(while CCT=1 results in a ratio similar to the original one).
Notice that, for fine-grained model 2, the ratio is lower
than one, which means that the model is being trained
with more Anomaly-labeled instances than Normal-labeled
ones. Additionally, the table presents these attributes for
R(C(20, 10), C(25, 10), 0.5, 0.5) model, which is essen-
tially identical to C(20, 10) (a smaller baseline model), that
returns all of the data instance classifications only by the
coarse-grained model. This RADE model demonstrates that
the fine-grained models are essential to achieve sufficient
Anomaly F1, even when their total test dataset fraction is
relatively low (e.g., 2.34% for CCT=0.915).
A better CCT and TCT configuration for this RADE
model, R(C(20, 10), C(25, 10), 0.995, 1.0), is achieved by
the grid-search process mentioned above, as further detailed
next in Table 2.
5.3 RADE vs. standard methods
We compare RADE to the baseline models over an AWS
m5d.16xlarge EC2 instance with Ubuntu 16.04 OS (Ama-
zon EC2, 2019), and summarize the evaluation results in
Table 2. The results of RF, XGBoost and AdaBoost are
summarized, while similar improvements are obtained for
GBDT and LightGBM. For each classifier and dataset, we
present results for the baseline model and two different con-
figurations of RADE. We rely on 5-fold cross-validation
and report the mean values.
5.3.1 Bagging - Random Forest
Anomaly detection. For all three datasets RADE exhibits
competitive or superior F1 scores as compared to the base-
line7. Specifically, the results are somewhat similar for the
KDD and CCF; whereas for FC, both RADE configurations
result in an advantage of ≈ +2.4% in Anomaly F1.
Model size. All RADE model sizes are notably smaller
than their corresponding baseline model. For example,
for KDD, R(C(10, 10), C(20, 20), 0.98, 0.995) is 5.46×
7As mentioned, we consider F1 score as the ML performance
measure for anomaly detection (i.e., imbalanced datasets). Nev-
ertheless, we also evaluate RADE models for AUC and Average
Precision and reach similar conclusions.
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(a) How CCT and TCT(=CCT) affect different metrics. The two
CCT values that achieve the highest Anomaly F1 are marked.
Index CCT Anom-aly F1
Fine
Grained
(FG) train
data
fraction
FG
Nor./Anom.
train data
ratio
[M1fg , M2fg]
FG
total
test data
fraction
- 0.5 0.810 0.0% nan, nan 0.0%
1 0.915 0.853 2.32% 45.11, 0.348 2.34%
2 1.0 0.852 98.4% 567.7, 0.136 98.2%
(b) RADE attributes for the marked CCT values in (a), and for
CCT=0.5 – i.e., when all coarse-grained model classifications are
considered as valid. Note that the original Normal to Anomaly
instance ratio of CCF is 581.4, and the Anomaly F1 of the corre-
sponding baseline model is 0.845471.
Figure 4: How CCT and TCT(=CCT) affect RADE, demon-
strated with RF-based R(C(20, 10), C(25, 10),−,−) for
CCF dataset.
smaller than C(150, None).
Training time. For all three datasets, the training time of
RADE is significantly lower. For example, it is 6.42× faster
for KDD. These lower training times come in line with the
smaller size of the coarse-grained model as compared to the
baseline and the small fractions of the training data that are
used for the training of the fine-grained models.
Classification latency. The improvement of RADE over
the baseline is consistent and is up to 7.23× faster due to
the smaller latency introduced by the coarse-grained model.
Even when considering the worst-case classification latency
for RADE (i.e., a query that takes the path of coarse-grained
model and then the slowest fine-grained model) RADE is
still competitive. The non-negligible difference between the
average and worst-case classification latency for RADE falls
in line with the small fractions of queries taking the long
path (e.g., 5.56% for both fine-grained models for KDD).
5.3.2 Boosting - XGBoost and AdaBoost
Anomaly detection. For all three datasets, RADE exhibits
competitive or superior anomaly detection capabilities as
compared to the baseline. For example, for XGBoost over
FC, RADE configuration achieves a better Anomaly F1 by
+0.5%; and for AdaBoost over FC, RADE configurations
improve the Anomaly F1 by ≈ +1% and +0.6%.
Model size. XGBoost model sizes of RADE and the base-
line are competitive. AdaBoost model sizes of RADE are
up to 2.92× larger than the baseline. This is of less concern
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Table 2: Comparison among two RADE configurations to the baseline over three classification DTEM methods, each with
three different datasets. All results are obtained using 5-fold cross-validation. RADE achieves competitive and often superior
F1 score with lower training time, classification latency, and superior (for bagging) or competitive (for boosting) model size.
Classifier Dataset # Model
Normal
F1
Anomaly
F1
Model
size
[MB]
Train
time
[s]
Fine-grained
train data
% [fg1, fg2]
Classification
latency
[µs]
RADE
worst-case
classification
latency [µs]
Fine-grained
test data
% [fg1, fg2]
1 Baseline – C(150, None) 0.999913 0.995190 5.57 22.5 – 9.4 – –
2 R(C(10, 10), C(20, 20), 0.98, 0.995) 0.999910 0.995028 1.02 3.5 9.55%, 0.57% 1.3 6.9 5.19%, 0.37%KDD
3 R(C(10, 10), C(35, 20), 0.98, 0.98) 0.999911 0.995091 1.54 3.6 5.38%, 0.35% 1.3 10.1 5.19%, 0.37%
4 Baseline – C(85, None) 0.999759 0.845471 2.01 75.6 – 6.2 – –
5 R(C(20, 10), C(30, 20), 0.94, 0.953) 0.999733 0.840198 0.82 20.3 6.82%, 0.09% 1.9 4.7 3.72%, 0.06%CCF
6 R(C(20, 10), C(25, 10), 0.995, 1.0) 0.999756 0.854553 0.63 40.7 97.57%, 0.20% 2.1 3.4 41.78%, 0.09%
7 Baseline – C(80, None) 0.999379 0.859186 9.95 16.7 – 5.2 – –
8 R(C(20, 15), C(35, 20), 1, 1.0) 0.999462 0.883542 5.96 6.9 6.28%, 1.23% 1.9 8.1 5.81%, 1.24%
RF
FC
9 R(C(20, 20), C(25, None), 0.99, 0.9966) 0.999438 0.882269 4.66 6.3 2.76%, 0.58% 1.8 7.9 2.46%, 0.58%
10 Baseline – C(450, 3) 0.999933 0.996294 0.25 196.5 – 13.6 – –
11 R(C(70, 5), C(250, 3), 0.99, 0.99444) 0.999934 0.996356 0.32 49.4 0.33%, 0.13% 3.6 11.4 0.12%, 0.10%KDD
12 R(C(90, 5), C(350, 3), 0.99, 0.9988) 0.999934 0.996357 0.40 65.3 0.70%, 0.24% 4.7 15.1 0.08%, 0.08%
13 Baseline – C(500, 3) 0.999803 0.877078 0.28 252.4 – 16.4 – –
14 R(C(70, 5), C(200, 3), 0.99, 0.9977) 0.999792 0.873624 0.26 61.7 0.82%, 0.15% 3.9 13.0 0.15%, 0.07%CCF
15 R(C(90, 5), C(300, 3), 0.908, 0.98) 0.999800 0.878426 0.32 77.9 0.09%, 0.05% 4.9 14.7 0.02%, 0.02%
16 Baseline – C(2000, 3) 0.999495 0.891222 1.21 1367.9 – 58.9 – –
17 R(C(70, 5), C(300, 5), 0.99, 0.995) 0.999489 0.892526 0.85 79.4 1.94%, 0.50% 3.9 20.5 1.13%, 0.41%
XGBoost
FC
18 R(C(70, 5), C(500, 5), 0.99, 0.99) 0.999506 0.896179 1.23 83.0 1.49%, 0.48% 4.0 29.9 1.13%, 0.41%
19 Baseline – C(700, 3) 0.999943 0.996854 0.92 874.6 – 136.6 – –
20 R(C(300, 3), C(500, 5), 0.64, 0.84) 0.999955 0.997485 2.48 630.6 99.96%, 1.76% 61.9 165.6 3.67%, 0.47%KDD
21 R(C(300, 3), C(450, 6), 0.669, 0.742) 0.999947 0.997084 2.69 462.4 59.23%, 1.51% 64.8 149.3 12.53%, 0.86%
22 Baseline – C(1100, 2) 0.999801 0.876765 0.99 2192.4 – 185.9 – –
23 R(C(200, 3), C(450, 6), 0.649, 0.649) 0.999798 0.877588 2.41 716.0 7.60%, 0.12% 39.6 118.4 7.52%, 0.10%CCF
24 R(C(450, 3), C(350, 6), 0.673, 0.855) 0.999808 0.882403 2.31 3048.6 96.70%, 0.17% 78.7 135.6 14.38%, 0.11%
25 Baseline – C(1000, 3) 0.999449 0.882856 1.44 1333.2 – 235.8 – –
26 R(C(300, 4), C(300, 6), 0.675, 0.855) 0.999477 0.892222 2.17 877.5 57.29%, 0.47% 73.2 147.6 4.33%, 0.46%
AdaBoost
FC
27 R(C(60, 3), C(350, 5), 0.68, 0.715) 0.999472 0.889118 3.10 115.9 5.99%, 0.79% 17.8 104.1 3.87%, 0.79%
Table 3: Raspberry Pi 3 - Training-time and classification la-
tency comparison between RADE and the baseline models.
RF XGBoost AdaBoost
#
Training
time [s]
Classification
Latency [µs] #
Training
time [s]
Classification
Latency [µs] #
Training
time [s]
Classification
Latency [µs]
1 567 127 10 2068 166 19 11727 1384
2
63
(9.0×)
26
(4.9×) 11
608
(3.4×)
53
(3.1×) 20
12433
(0.9×)
619
(2.2×)K
D
D 3
57
(10.0×)
22
(5.8×) 12
536
(3.9×)
47
(3.6×) 21
8021
(1.5×)
697
(2.0×)
4 848 89 13 2909 164 22 17524 1889
5
195
(4.4×)
41
(2.2×) 14
713
(4.1×)
49
(3.3×) 23
24905
(0.7×)
755
(2.5×)C
C
F 6
433
(2.0×)
41
(2.2×) 15
892
(3.3×)
45
(3.7×) 24
5681
(3.1×)
425
(4.4×)
7 363 66 16 9519 1831 25 24355 2596
8
113
(3.2×)
28
(2.3×) 17
601
(15.8×)
68
(26.9×) 26
22971
(1.1×)
762
(3.4×)F
C 9
116
(3.1×)
28
(2.3×) 18
588
(16.2×)
59
(30.8×) 27
2368
(10.3×)
203
(12.8×)
since AdaBoost DTEM is not memory bound (uses trees
with only a few (i.e., stumps) to several terminal nodes).
Training time. For all datasets, the training time of RADE
is significantly lower. For example, it is 17.2× faster for XG-
Boost over FC. These lower times adhere with the smaller
size of the coarse-grained models the smaller data fractions
that are used for the training of the fine-grained models.
Classification latency. The improvement in the mean clas-
sification latency of RADE over the baseline is even more
significant than in the case of RF. For example, it is 15.1×
faster for XGBoost over FC and 13.24× faster for AdaBoost
over FC. The worst-case classification time of RADE is also
competitive as compared to the baseline and is even superior
(by up to 2.83× faster) for the CCF and FC datasets. Note
that the classification latency grows linearly with respect to
the number of trees but only logarithmic in the (roughly bal-
anced) tree size (i.e., number of terminal nodes). Therefore,
the lower number of trees used by the coarse-grained and
fine-grained models of RADE results in faster classification
as compared to the baseline.
5.4 Raspberry Pi 3 evaluation
We evaluate RADE over Raspberry Pi 3 B+8 with Raspbian
9.8 OS (Raspberry Pi 3, 2018). Table 3 compares the train-
ing time and classification latency of RADE and baseline
models, for the same classification DTEM methods and
datasets, as in Table 2. The training time improvement of
RADE ranges from 0.7× up to 16.2×, and the classification
latency improvement ranges from 2× up to 30.8×.
6 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents RADE, an efficient DTEM classifica-
tion framework that augments standard DTEM classifiers to
obtain lower model memory size, training time and classifi-
cation latency, while obtaining competitive and often better
anomaly detection than the standard (baseline) models. We
also believe that RADE can be extended to support multi-
class classification. The straightforward approach is having
k fine-grained models for k classes. However, an immediate
concern is the scalability of this approach with respect to
the number of classes. Thus, better approaches that result
in less fine-grained models should be considered in order to
maintain the competitive attributes of RADE.
8ARM Cortex-A53 with 512 KB shared L2 and 1GB SDRAM.
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